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Introduction
Artur Mas, the regional leader of  Catalonia, signed 
a decree on Saturday, September 27 calling for a 
non-binding consultation on independence to be 
held on November 9 to determine the region’s fate. 
Recent polls indicate that half  of  Catalans would 
vote to break away from Spain, while the other half  
would vote to stay on current or more autonomous 
terms.1
Mas’s decree signals that he is determined to move 
ahead with his plans in spite of  Madrid’s adamant 
refusal to sanction a vote. It was also the latest 
maneuver in what has become a predictable colli-
sion course.
Consider the most probable scenario: Madrid is 
expected to present an appeal to the Spanish Con-
stitutional Court, arguing that the decree is illegal. 
The court will likely suspend the decree, and Mas, 
who has said that he wants to hold a legal, recog-
nized non-binding consultation, will likely have 
to call the November 9 consultation off. If  he 
backs down on the consultation, pressure will rise 
in Catalonia for early regional elections. In those 
elections, Mr. Mas’s pro-autonomy Convergència i 
Unió (CiU) will likely lose votes to the more radi-
cally pro-independence party, Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya (ERC). “In other words,” said Ferran 
Requejo, a professor at Pompeu Fabra University, 
“The political decision will be to substitute the con-
sultation with the elections.”2 If  CiU loses the next 
Catalan elections to ERC, Spanish Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy may soon face a new partner in Bar-
celona – one who is less willing to negotiate.
The contours of  this collision course first came 
into focus in May 2014, when ERC won the major-
ity of  Catalan votes in the European Union parlia-
mentary elections. After years of  being the most 
popular party in the region, CiU fell to second 
place. Anti-independence parties, including Span-
ish nationalist and socialist parties, tumbled in the 
polls.
These election results marked ERC’s emergence as 
a formidable political force and showed the grow-
ing popularity in Catalonia of  the idea of  secession, 
which received an important surge of  support dur-
ing the 2008 financial crisis. Since then, support 
for independence has doubled.3 It gained further 
momentum in 2010, when the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court ruled against many articles inscribed in 
the Catalan Statute of  Autonomy, which had been 
approved by Catalan voters in 2006. Among other 
issues, the court ruled that the Catalan language 
must not take priority over Spanish, and that the 
reference to Catalonia as a “nation” is not legally 
valid.
The centerpiece of  Catalan grievances is Madrid’s 
insistent refusal to allow a Catalan vote, which 
stands in glaring contrast to London’s approval of  
the (even more consequential) binding referendum 
in Scotland this September. Many more Catalans 
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– around 75 percent – support the right to vote 
in a plebiscite than those (circa 50 percent) who 
say they would actually opt to secede.4 As Alfred 
Bosch, a member of  parliament for the ERC in the 
Spanish Congress, said: “The more they deny us 
[the consultation], the more we will want it.”5
The momentum is culminating now. This October, 
in the lead-up to the proposed consultation date, 
may be Madrid’s last solid chance for a while to 
lower the temperature in Catalonia. An analysis of  
what has propelled Catalan secessionism is neces-
sary to evaluate how the two sides may best use 
this period to backpedal.
How We Got Here
The 2008 financial crisis, which devastated Spain’s 
economy, set into motion the current trend of  
rising Catalan secessionism. Catalonia, like other 
parts of  the country, suffered from soaring youth 
unemployment and budget cutbacks. But as one 
of  Spain’s wealthiest regions, Catalonia still con-
tributes a relatively large share of  taxes to Madrid, 
and these taxes are then redistributed throughout 
Spain’s autonomous communities. Catalonia’s fiscal 
deficit with Madrid – which some scholars estimate 
to be as high as 8.5 percent – led many Catalans 
to feel that their region was unfairly being dragged 
down by the weight of  a struggling Spain. Accord-
ing to Alfred Bosch, “Most Catalans feel aggrieved 
due to the fact that a disproportionate share of  the 
costs of  Spanish administration have been forced 
on us over the past 35 years. . . . Practically every-
one has a feeling that we have been, and are being, 
ripped off.”6
But fiscal woes alone cannot explain the phenome-
non. Many years after the crisis started, and despite 
some economic recovery, support for independence 
has continued to rise. Since the spark of  the finan-
cial crisis, the independence movement has since 
taken on a life of  its own. It is fueled by the rising 
use of  the Catalan language, a vibrant pro-indepen-
dence civil society movement, and substantial youth 
support. The numbers tell an inescapable truth: the 
independence movement has staying power.
Mother-language education in Catalan has been on 
the rise since 1983, when the Catalan parliament 
passed a linguistic normalization law that empha-
sized teaching Catalan in schools. Miguel Abellan, 
an advisor to the Catalan parliament, said that the 
growing use of  Catalan language since then has 
created a renewed sense of  Catalan identity. “Lan-
guage is at the epicenter of  Catalan nationalism,” 
he said. “The education my generation received 
is completely different than people who are now 
twenty are receiving. There’s a nationalist bias in 
education.”7
According to the EUSCAT Project, a study con-
ducted by the Barcelona Institute of  International 
Studies (Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacio-
nales, IBEI), there is a strong correlation between 
the use of  Catalan language and support for 
independence.8 Eighty-four percent of  those who 
chose to respond to the study’s questionnaire in 
Catalan (indicating that they were habitual Catalan 
speakers) supported independence. By contrast, 
only 24.9 percent of  those who chose to respond 
in Spanish voted for independence. Diego Muro, 
an assistant professor at IBEI who worked on the 
study, explained that choice of  language is the best 
predictor of  support for independence. “Language 
is one of  the pillars of  the Catalan identity and 
the frequency of  its use is therefore strongly con-
nected to attitudes towards secession from Spain,” 
he said. “Other factors, such as the level of  educa-
tion, the area of  residence, or the gender of  the 
respondents do not have much explanatory power 
in this context.”9
The more widespread use of  Catalan language in 
schools has given wings to a new generation with 
a strong sense of  Catalan identity. Indeed, support 
for Catalan independence among youth is especially 
high: at least 60 percent. For those just entering the 
job market, the dire consequences of  the economic 
crisis have also pushed youth to support indepen-
dence. Unable to find emotionally fulfilling and 
challenging jobs that match their level of  education, 
many Catalan youth have discovered a sense of  
cause and purpose in the independence movement.
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Youth also play a significant role in pro-indepen-
dence civil society, organizing social media cam-
paigns and public demonstrations in support of  
independence. The Catalan National Assembly 
(Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC), the larg-
est civil society movement in the region, has over 
30,000 members (and at least 20,000 more activists) 
and has organized highly coordinated demonstra-
tions of  millions of  people in support of  indepen-
dence for the past several years on Catalan National 
Day (September 11). In 2013, the ANC organized a 
human chain of  1.6 million people stretching from 
Catalonia’s border with France to that with Valen-
cia (covering 250 miles). This year, hundreds of  
thousands of  Catalans demonstrated in support of  
holding a vote in downtown Barcelona.
At least part of  the reason for the ANC’s success is 
that the cause has broad appeal. It does not main-
tain official links with political parties or proclaim 
any political agenda other than pro-independence. 
This “lowest common denominator” platform has 
won the ANC support across the pro-indepen-
dence camp. Ricard Gene, a member of  the ANC’s 
secretariat, explained: “From a political point of  
view, we [the ANC members] think quite differ-
ently. We have people from the right-wing to the 
extreme left working hand-in-hand in the Assem-
blea.”10 As Ferran Requejo explained, “because the 
ANC is not controlled by any political party, it has 
maintained purity.”11
The ANC has become one of  the most powerful 
and active engines of  the Catalan independence 
movement. The group effectively utilizes both the 
virtual world on-the-ground initiatives to reach 
out to supporters; active social media accounts 
and slick websites co-exist with pro-independence 
booths set up throughout the city year-round and 
added presence at the September 11 rallies. Accord-
ing to Gene, in the lead-up to the scheduled date 
for the non-binding consultation this November, 
the ANC will focus on swaying undecided voters. 
The ANC’s immense mobilization capacities in  
this regard will likely be boosted by the general 
frustration in Catalonia with Madrid’s refusal to 
allow a vote.
Moving Forward
Any deal that Madrid may offer to Barcelona would 
need to go far beyond fiscal concessions. In addi-
tion to a financial settlement, Madrid would at the 
very minimum need to endow Catalonia with more 
autonomy regarding language rights, support poli-
cies that would open up new economic opportuni-
ties for youth in the region, and confer directly with 
Catalan civil society. Such a deal, if  serious, would 
possibly necessitate a new constitution that would 
institute federalism in Spain.
But it may be hard to negotiate such an extensive 
bargain at this point in time. Catalonia and Spain 
have reached a stalemate; in the absence of  any 
serious negotiation initiatives, more and more Cata-
lans are turning to the independence movement as 
the only solution. Andrew Dowling, a professor at 
Cardiff  University, explained:
 Now support for independence is around 50–55 
percent of  the electorate. It hasn’t grown, and 
it hasn’t fallen back either, so we are very much 
looking at a stabilization of  the movement. This 
means that it is a highly credible political move-
ment that is not going away, contrary to what 
people in Madrid think. The idea that it’s a flash 
in the pan, or that it’s all about money – the 
movement has been going on for far too long 
for those arguments to be credible.12
Clever utilization of  a few key players and issues, 
however, may offer an opportunity for both sides 
to walk back to a point where negotiations over a 
deal may begin.
The non-binding consultation: The fastest and easi-
est way for Madrid to reverse course would be to 
allow a non-binding consultation, demonstrating 
its good faith to the growing number of  Catalans 
who are frustrated with what they see as the cen-
tral government’s insulting patronization. As Mas 
wrote in a New York Times op-ed in 2013, “the best 
way to solve any problem is to remove its cause. 
We seek the freedom to vote.”13 Of  course, hold-
ing a consultation risks allowing the independence 
camp to win it. But denying it will only bolster the 
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secessionist cause and encourage Catalans to seek 
an alternative – for example, early elections – which 
could have even more serious implications than a 
non-binding consultation would.
Artur Mas: Mas perhaps has the most to lose from 
the current collision course. If  Madrid’s refusal to 
allow a legal non-binding consultation succeeds 
in pressuring him to delay or call off  the non-
binding consultation, he will likely lose support in 
Catalonia. If  he calls early elections in place of  a 
non-binding consultation, his party will likely lose 
some votes to ERC. For the first time in almost 
a year, Mas and Rajoy met at the end of  last July 
to discuss the non-binding consultation, regional 
financing, and a new education law. The icy two-
hour talks failed to bridge the divide over the non-
binding consultation, but Mas declared that a new 
“climate of  open dialogue” had been established.14 
Rajoy should jump on this opportunity before it is 
too late; if  CiU loses the next Catalan elections to 
ERC, Rajoy may face a new Catalan leader who is 
less willing than Mas to negotiate.
The monarchy: Barcelona and Madrid may look to 
the new monarchy to create favorable negotiation 
conditions. Within a week of  ascending the throne, 
King Felipe VI, delivered a speech in Catalan, an 
important overture intended to break with the 
image of  his predecessor, King Juan Carlos, whose 
popularity in Catalonia had plummeted in recent 
years. This overture should encourage both sides  
to look to the King to create conditions conducive 
to negotiation. Diego Muro of  IBEI said: “We 
know the King can’t provide a solution … [but 
what] he can do is tell people to talk and provide a 
space for that.”15
The threat of  losing EU membership: The majority 
of  Catalan separatists hope to remain in the EU, 
and studies show that support for independence 
would drop dramatically if  an independent Cata-
lonia were excluded from the EU. According to 
IBEI’s EUSCAT Project, when presented with 
the scenario that an independent Catalonia would 
not be able to join the EU, 5.6 percent of  survey 
respondents who said they favored an independent 
state changed their minds and no longer supported 
secession. Yet the EU has remained vague on the 
process by which an independent Catalonia would 
enter the EU after its hypothetical secession from 
Spain. If  the EU at least were to declare that an 
independent Catalonia would not automatically 
enter the EU, sketching the outlines of  the required 
accession process, support for outright indepen-
dence would likely decline.
The breakaway of  one of  Spain’s wealthiest regions 
would not go down easy. Poorer Spanish prov-
inces that depend on national revenue to maintain 
public services would be especially hard hit. Cata-
lonia’s relationship with Europe would need to be 
reworked. The new country’s own economy could 
suffer during the transition period. A significant 
percentage of  Catalans may feel less at home in 
their new state, giving rise to new tensions. Yet 
none of  this means that Catalonia should, by 
some objective principle, forever remain a part of  
Spain. If  a considerable percentage of  the popula-
tion desires to break away, the EU, and ultimately 
Madrid, should work toward an agreement that 
accommodates the new state.
Cale Salih is a writer based in Barcelona focusing 
on secessionist movements. She is an alumna of 
the EUMEF program.
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